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A New Lens: Reframing the 
Conversation about the Use of Video 
Conferencing in Civil Trials in Ontario
AMY SALYZYN *
The state of courtroom technology in Ontario is increasingly capturing the attention of both 
the public and the legal profession. This article seeks to contribute to the conversation on 
this issue by focusing on one particular technology in Ontario’s courtrooms: the use of 
video conferencing to receive witness testimony in civil trials. The central claim is that 
the approach to video conferencing that dominates the policy discourse refl ects an overly 
narrow, instrumentalist view of technology that fails to adequately take account of possible 
broader political and social implications as well as this technology’s transformative potential. 
This argument is developed by exploring two different sources of risk associated with the 
implementation of video-conferencing technology in civil trials: (1) how video conferencing, 
as a mediating technology, may unintentionally interfere with credibility assessments and 
emotional connections between courtroom participants; and (2) the ways in which video 
conferencing, by disrupting the physical geography of adjudication, threatens the solemnity 
associated with, and respect given to, the civil justice system.
A detailed consideration of these risks reveals that video conferencing engages fundamental 
questions about our civil justice system and implicates democratic values in ways that require 
more nuanced consideration in conversations about its use. Rather than offer a fi nal verdict 
on the use of video conferencing in civil trials in Ontario, this article concludes by calling for 
deeper and broader discourse on this issue. This discussion should include all stakeholders 
in a conversation about if and how video-conferencing technology should be incorporated 
into our civil justice system.
* J.S.D. Candidate, Yale Law School, LL.M. Yale Law School, J.D. University of Toronto. An 
earlier draft of this paper was completed during the author’s LL.M. studies at Yale Law School 
in the context of a course entitled “Representing Justice: Courts, Democracy, and Contestation” 
and taught by Professor Dennis E. Curtis and Professor Judith Resnik. Th e author is grateful 
to Professors Curtis and Resnik for their insights, encouragement, and helpful comments. Th e 
author is also grateful to members of the Vers une cyberjustice/Towards Cyberjustice group for 
their helpful feedback at their annual meeting in October 2012 and, in particular, to Professor 
Jane Bailey for her support. Finally, a sincere and large “thank you” is owed to Professor Jena 
McGill for her detailed feedback and support during the drafting of this paper.
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L’état de la technologie dans les salles d’audience de l’Ontario retient de plus en plus 
l’attention du public et des juristes. Cet article se penche sur cette question en mettant 
l’accent sur une technologie particulière employée dans les salles d’audience ontariennes, 
l’utilisation de la vidéoconférence pour entendre des témoignages lors de procès civils. Notre 
argumentation prétend que l’approche envers la vidéoconférence qui a fi ni par dominer le 
discours en matière de politiques considère de manière trop étroite et instrumentale la tech-
nologie et ne prend pas en compte de manière adéquate la possibilité de plus importantes 
répercussions politiques et sociales, ni le potentiel de transformation inhérent à cette tech-
nologie. Nous examinons pour ce faire deux risques découlant de la mise en œuvre de la 
technologie de la vidéoconférence lors de procès civils : 1) comment la vidéoconférence, 
à titre de technologie d’appariement, peut interférer sans le vouloir avec l’évaluation de la 
crédibilité et les liens émotifs des participants de la salle d’audience et 2) la manière dont 
la vidéoconférence, en éparpillant géographiquement le processus de décision, perturbe la 
solennité du système de justice civil et le respect qui lui est dû.
Un examen détaillé de ces risques révèle que la vidéoconférence soulève des ques-
tions fondamentales au sujet de notre système de justice civile et met en cause les valeurs 
démocratiques d’une manière qui exige une réfl exion plus nuancée lors des discussions 
touchant son utilisation. Plutôt que d’offrir un verdict fi nal sur l’utilisation de la vidéocon-
férence lors de procès civils en Ontario, cet article arrive à la conclusion que notre discours 
sur cet enjeu devrait s’approfondir et s’élargir. Ce discours doit inclure tous les intervenants 
dans une discussion pour savoir dans quelle mesure et de quelle manière il est souhaitable 
d’incorporer la technologie de la vidéoconférence dans notre système de justice civile.
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We make our technologies, and they, in turn, shape us. So of every technology we must 
ask, Does it serve our human purposes?—a question that causes us to reconsider what 
these purposes are. Technologies, in every generation, present opportunities to refl ect on 
our values and direction.
- Sherry Turkle1
THE STATE OF COURTROOM TECHNOLOGY in Ontario is an issue that has captured 
the attention of both the public and the legal profession. In 2011, a Canadian 
Press article described the many ways that Ontario’s courts fail to adopt otherwise 
widely used technologies and raised the provocative question, “[a]re Ontario’s 
courts the place technology forgot?”2 A few weeks later, Th e Lawyers Weekly 
published an article entitled “E-trials seen as ‘essential’ for justice in the future,” 
reporting on a specialized courtroom in Toronto outfi tted for “electronic trials” 
and lamenting that “for all their promise, e-courtrooms have yet to reach a 
tipping point.”3 Despite popular interest, however, there is little scholarly work in 
Canada on the issue of courtroom technology. Th is article seeks to fi ll this gap by 
focusing on one particular technology in Ontario’s courtrooms: the use of video-
conferencing technology to receive witness testimony in civil trials.
For over a decade, the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure have allowed for 
witnesses in civil trials to testify remotely using video-conferencing technology. To 
date, however, judges have exercised caution and this technology has not become 
a routine fi xture in this province’s civil courts. As is later discussed, policy discourse 
encouraging the use of new technologies in Ontario’s civil justice system suggests 
that this should change. Video-conferencing technology, in particular, has been 
increasingly characterized as a positive development, off ering a cheaper, more 
fl exible way to receive evidence in court. Effi  ciency is the guiding norm, with 
improved access to justice being the stated policy goal. From this perspective, 
judicial resistance to more widespread use of video-conferencing technology 
appears to be obstructing easily obtainable improvements to the civil justice 
system.
In this article, I argue that the approach to video conferencing that has come 
to dominate the policy discourse refl ects an overly narrow, instrumentalist view 
1. Alone Together: Why We Expect More from Technology and Less from Each Other (New York: 
Basic Books, 2011) at 19.
2. Allison Jones, “No Internet, no BlackBerrys. Are Ontario’s courts the place technology 
forgot?” Th e Canadian Press (15 March 2011), online: <http://www.citynews.ca/2011/03/15/
no-internet-no-blackberrys-are-ontarios-courts-the-place-technology-forgot/>.
3. Luigi Benetton, “E-trials seen as ‘essential’ for justice in the future,” Th e Lawyers Weekly 
(22 April 2011), online: <http://www.lawyersweekly.ca/index.php?section=article&article
id=1396>.
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of technology. I critique this approach as failing to take into account potential 
unintended eff ects of video conferencing and broader social and political implications 
of using this technology. I develop this argument by exploring two diff erent 
sources of risk: (1) how video conferencing, as a mediating technology, may 
unintentionally interfere with credibility assessments and emotional connections 
amongst courtroom participants; and (2) the ways in which video conferencing, 
by disrupting the geography of adjudication, threatens the solemnity associated 
with, and respect given to, the civil justice system. Th ese risks, in my view, require 
caution in introducing video-conferencing technology and a more nuanced, 
collective conversation about its use that meaningfully engages with these risks 
and with the transformative potential of this technology. Moreover, as I will 
analyze in more detail, these risks engage fundamental questions about our 
civil justice system and democratic values. As such, this reframed conversation 
requires the attention not only of policy makers, but of all stakeholders. 
Th is article proceeds in fi ve parts. In Part I, I introduce Rule 1.08 of the 
Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs the use of trial testimony 
received through video conferencing. Th e cautious approach taken by Ontario 
courts is revealed and contrasted with policy statements that encourage greater 
use of technology in the province’s civil justice system. Part II introduces the 
philosophical accounts of technology that guide my critique. Parts III and IV 
examine the potential consequences of using video-conferencing technology 
that are not accounted for in the dominant policy approach. In Part III, I 
examine these eff ects from the perspective of video conferencing as a mediating 
technology, while in Part IV I focus on the ways in which video conferencing 
may disrupt the geography of adjudication. Finally, in Part V, I revisit the case for 
caution in using video-conferencing technology, arguing that discourse regarding 
the use of video-conferencing technology should be broadened and deepened so 
that all stakeholders take part in a discussion of whether to further incorporate 
video-conferencing technology into our civil justice system.
I. THE STATE OF PLAY: THE CURRENT TREATMENT OF 
VIDEO-CONFERENCING TECHNOLOGY IN THE CASE LAW 
AND IN POLICY
A. RULE 1.08 AND ITS JUDICIAL APPLICATION
First introduced in 1999, Rule 1.08 of the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides, inter alia, that a witness’s oral evidence at trial may be received by video 
conference if the parties consent; and that in the absence of consent, evidence may 
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be received by video conference upon motion or on the court’s own initiative.4 
Even if the parties consent, the receipt of evidence through video conferencing is 
not permitted as a matter of right, but is always subject to the discretion of the 
court. In exercising its discretion, the court is required to take the following seven 
factors into account:
1. Th e general principle that evidence and argument should be presented 
orally in open court;
2. Th e importance of the evidence to the determination of the issues in 
the case;
3. Th e eff ect of the telephone or video conference on the court’s ability 
to make fi ndings, including determinations about the credibility of 
witnesses;
4. Th e importance in the circumstances of the case of observing the 
demeanour of a witness;
5. Whether a party, witness or lawyer for a party is unable to attend 
because of infi rmity, illness, or any other reason;
6. Th e balance of convenience between the party wishing the telephone 
or video conference and the party or parties opposing; and
7. Any other relevant matter.5 
4. Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990, Reg 194, r 1.08.
5. Ibid. In Ontario, the Civil Rules Committee has statutorily delegated power to make civil 
rules of procedure, but the Committee’s agendas and minutes are not publicly available. See 
Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c C-43, s 66(1); Coulter A Osborne, Civil Justice Reform 
Project: Summary of Findings and Recommendations (Toronto: Ontario Ministry of the 
Attorney General, 2007) at 128 [Osborne Report]). Accordingly, there is no legislative history 
that provides an offi  cial rationale for the introduction of Rule 1.08. Prior to the introduction 
of Rule 1.08, however, video conferencing had been used to receive both motion and 
trial evidence. See e.g. Guarantee Co of North America v Nuythen (1997), 119 ACWS (3d) 
510, OJ No 5183 (QL) (Gen Div) (granting the plaintiff ’s request to cross-examine the 
defendant, resident in British Columbia, on his affi  davit in relation to a pending summary 
judgment motion); and Freeswick v Forbes (1996), 62 ACWS (3d) 910, OJ No 1266 (QL) 
(Gen Div) at para 17 (reporting that one of the medical witnesses “testifi ed at the trial by 
way of video conference.”)). Moreover, there was express policy support for the adoption of 
video-conferencing technology in civil cases (see e.g. Ontario Civil Justice Review, First Report 
(Toronto: Ontario Ministry of Attorney General, 1995) at 18.4 [Ont CJR First Report]; 
and Ontario Civil Justice Review, Supplemental and Final Report (Toronto: Ontario Ministry 
of Attorney General, 1996) at 4.5 [Ont CJR Final Report]. Notwithstanding the fact that 
video-conferencing technology had been successfully used in a number of civil cases prior 
to 1999, the absence of a specifi c rule permitting evidence to be received in this manner led 
at least one judge to conclude that he did not have the discretion to admit such evidence 
at trial over the objections of one of the parties (see Richard v Doell (1998), 77 ACWS (3d) 
526, OJ No 660 (QL) (Gen Div)). Th e introduction of Rule 1.08 in 1999 served to clear up 
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Th ere have only been a handful of reported cases interpreting Rule 1.08, and 
the rule has not yet been subject to review by the Court of Appeal for Ontario.6 
One of the earliest reported cases that considered Rule 1.08, Pack All Manufacturing 
Inc v Triad Plastics Inc,7 involved a plaintiff  seeking an order under Rule 1.08 to 
receive, by way of video conference, the trial evidence of a witness who worked 
and resided in Virginia. Th e defendant had consented to the receipt of evidence 
of other trial witnesses through video conferencing but took the position that 
this particular witness needed to appear live at trial because of crucial credibility 
issues. In considering the plaintiff ’s motion, Justice Rutherford spoke favourably 
of the available technology, commenting that, 
In my experience, a trial judge can see, hear and evaluate a witness’ testimony very 
well, assuming the video-conference arrangements are good. Seeing the witness, full 
face on in colour and live in a conference facility is arguably as good or better than 
seeing the same witness obliquely from one side as is the case in our traditional 
courtrooms here in the Ottawa Court House.8
However, notwithstanding his positive view of video-conferencing technology, 
Justice Rutherford ultimately dismissed the plaintiff ’s motion. In reaching this 
conclusion, he noted that taking evidence by video conference “is not a manner 
of taking evidence available to the parties as a matter of right.”9 He further stated 
that, despite his sympathy for time and cost savings associated with taking this 
particular witness’ evidence through video conferencing, he was not convinced that 
there was “enough to be gained to overcome the conventional rule that evidence 
be given by a witness, in person, in court, and the contention by counsel for the 
defendant that cross-examination of this important witness whose credibility is 
important to the trial may be rendered less eff ective.”10 In reaching this decision, 
Justice Rutherford accorded considerable weight to the fact that there was no 
evidence that the witness in question was “unable or unwilling for any reason to 
come to Ottawa and testify of her own volition.”11
any confusion regarding the authority of the court to allow witnesses to give trial testimony 
through video conferencing.
6. In the category of reported cases, I include those cases electronically reported in the 
Quicklaw and Westlaw commercial databases, the CanLII electronic collection, and those 
published in offi  cial reporters.
7. (2001), 119 ACWS (3d) 240, OJ No 5882 (QL) (Sup Ct) [Pack All].
8. Ibid at para 6.
9. Ibid at para 11.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
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Following Justice Rutherford’s decision in Pack All Manufacturing, Ontario 
courts have been hesitant to grant motions pursuant to Rule 1.08.12 In the reported 
cases in which courts have permitted video-conferenced evidence, strong evidence 
of the unavailability of a witness to attend at trial appears to operate as a dominant 
factor. For example, in Archambault v Kalandi Anstalt,13 the court allowed a witness 
residing in Austria to testify at trial through video conferencing notwithstanding 
the witness’ admission that the reason she refused to attend the trial was that the 
she had an outstanding Ontario judgment against her for more than 9 million 
dollars. In granting the motion, Master Beaudoin stated that his “ultimate concern 
is that there will be a full adjudication of the issues in this dispute”14 and found 
that there was “no evidence of prejudice” if the witness was permitted to give her 
evidence through video conferencing.15  
In two recent decisions, Ontario courts have granted orders allowing video-
conferenced testimony where it was not contended that such witnesses would 
be unavailable. In these cases, however, the relevant witnesses lived far from 
Canada. In Paiva v Corpening,16 a decision released in February 2012, Justice 
12. See Feeney v Labatt (2007), 154 ACWS (3d) 831 at para 12, OJ No 258 (QL) (Master). Th e 
court denied the defendant’s motion to have the evidence of a Belgian resident received by 
video conference notwithstanding the court’s acceptance of Justice Rutherford’s comments 
regarding the minimal eff ect of video-conference testimony on credibility assessments. Th e 
witness in this case was said, through an affi  davit of one of his lawyers, to be scheduled to 
be on holidays and then in board meetings during the two weeks of trial. In rejecting the 
defendant’s motion, Master Brott stated that she was “not convinced that [the defendant] 
should be able to overcome the general principle that evidence is to be given in person in a 
courtroom, simply because [the witness] has a busy schedule and wants to spend time with 
his family.” See also Lynch v Segal, [2005] OJ No 1275 at para 4 (QL) (Sup Ct). Th e court 
denied a motion to have a witness’ testimony received through video-conferencing on the 
basis that his testimony would be important and involve serious issues of credibility and, 
therefore, “should be presented in open court in the presence of the trial judge.”
13. (2006),150 ACWS (3d) 811 at para 18, OJ No 3428 (QL) (Sup Ct), aff ’d (2007), 154 
ACWS (3d) 831, OJ No 258 (QL) (Sup Ct).
14. Ibid at para 27.
15. Ibid at para 26. Other cases evidence a similar focus on the unavailability of witnesses. 
See e.g. Maggio Holding Inc v Carrier Canada Ltd, [2003] OJ No 1810 (QL) (Sup Ct) at 
para 3 (permitting the evidence of a witness residing in Texas to be received through video 
conferencing under Rule 1.08 after the witness “made it clear he [would] not voluntarily 
attend at trial”); Yunger v Zolty, 2011 ONSC 5943 at para 120, OJ No 4459 (QL) (ordering 
the grandfather of children involved in a family law dispute to give his testimony remotely 
through SkypeTM or another video-conferencing technology after he refused to travel from 
Switzerland, where he lived, to Toronto for questioning).
16. [2012] ONCJ No 88, OJ No 771 (QL).
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Murray granted a request by an applicant mother in a family law dispute to 
allow for her and her spouse, who lived in Denmark, to be cross-examined via 
video conferencing (using Skype™ technology) at trial. She argued that requiring 
her and her spouse to travel to Toronto to testify would be fi nancially burdensome 
and would create child-care problems. A month later, in Aly v Halal Meat Inc,17 
Justice Ricchetti considered a pre-trial motion by the plaintiff s to call two 
witnesses at trial via live Skype™ video link. Th e witnesses resided in Egypt and 
China, respectively, and cited travel time and cost as the basis for requesting the 
order. Ultimately, Justice Ricchetti granted an order allowing only one of the 
witnesses—who was to give brief evidence that was not central to any of the 
issues to be tried—to testify via Skype™. Notwithstanding his expressed confi dence 
in Skype™ technology and in the ability of the court to assess demeanour in the 
case of video-conferenced evidence, Justice Ricchetti rejected the request to have 
the evidence of the second witness presented by way of video conferencing, noting 
that the evidence could be central to one of the issues to be decided.
It is diffi  cult to draw generalizations from the handful of reported cases 
under Rule 1.08. Th is diffi  culty is compounded by the existence of a number 
of reported cases in which courts have received video-conferenced trial evidence, 
but which are not accompanied by a reported motion under Rule 1.08 and do 
not include a discussion in the reported judgment of the circumstances under 
which the decision was made to admit the video-conferenced evidence.18 
Nevertheless, it seems clear from the reported cases interpreting Rule 1.08 that 
the courts have given signifi cant weight to the fi rst factor listed in the Rule: “the 
general principle that evidence and argument should be presented orally in open 
court.”19 With this principle as the baseline, video conferencing is treated as a 
technological tool to be used sparingly. Overall, the approach is one of caution.
17. [2012] ONCJ No 199 at para 30, ONSC 2585.
18. See e.g. Korea Data Systems Co v Aamazing Technologies Inc, 2012 ONSC 3922 at para 154, 
OJ No 3202 (QL) (reporting that witness from Taiwan gave his evidence through video 
conferencing); Braafhart v Braafhart, 2011 ONSC 270 at para 15, OJ No 1132 (QL) 
(reporting that one witness “provided his evidence by way of video conference over the 
internet utilizing the services of Skype”); Malenfant v Lavergne, 2010 ONSC 2894 at para 3, OJ 
No 2669 (QL) [Malenfant] (reporting that “[d]uring the trial, the evidence of the witnesses 
in London and Victoria were heard by video link”); Billings v Mississauga (City), 2010 ONSC 
3101 at para 50, OJ No 3304 (QL) (reporting that one witness “testifi ed at this trial by 
video link”).
19. Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 4. 
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B. THE DOMINANT POLICY APPROACH TO COURTROOM TECHNOLOGIES 
Th e courts’ cautious approach to video conferencing is diffi  cult to reconcile with 
expressed policy objectives encouraging the use of new technologies in Ontario’s 
civil justice system. Embracing innovative technological solutions as a means 
of improving the eff ectiveness of the civil justice system has long been a stated 
policy goal of the Ontario government and judiciary. Even prior to the introduc-
tion of Rule 1.08, both the 1995 First Report of the Ontario Civil Justice Review 
(“First Report”) and the 1996 Supplemental and Final Report (“Final Report”) 
were enthusiastic about the use of video-conferencing technology. Th e First Report 
recommended, under the heading “Th e Need For Video Conferencing,” that “a 
pilot project be established to test the utility of video conferencing technology 
in civil matters.”20 Th e First Report took the position that “there is little doubt that 
video conferencing technology creates the potential for reduced costs and greater 
fl exibility in the system.”21
In response to the First Report, several pilot projects were established. Th e 
evaluations of these projects in the 1996 Supplemental and Final Report of the 
Civil Justice Review focused on cost savings and convenience, reporting that “[i]n 
several civil matters, including a civil jury trial, witnesses have been examined 
and cross-examined by video with positive results—and in the process, saving 
substantial travel costs to the parties and allowing scheduled trials to proceed 
as planned.”22 Th e endorsement of video-conferencing technology in these 
reports was one manifestation of a broader recognition that there was “a need 
to modernize” Ontario’s civil justice system and leave behind “outdated approaches 
to conducting business.”23  
Roughly a decade later, the Civil Justice Reform Project headed by Justice 
Coulter Osborne also addressed technology issues. Th e 2007 Osborne Report 
recommended, among other things, that “[t]he judiciary and courts administration 
should make every reasonable eff ort to accommodate requests for the use of 
technology in individual cases, where possible.”24 Moreover, it specifi cally 
recommended that Rule 1.08 be amended to provide express authority for the 
court to order that a matter be heard by video conference on its own initiative.25 
Although there was no elaboration of the rationale for this recommendation, 
20. Ont CJR First Report, supra note 5 at 18.4.
21. Ibid. 
22. Ont CJR Final Report, supra note 5.
23. Ont CJR First Report, supra note 5 at 18.1.
24. Osborne Report, supra note 5 at xxi.
25. Ibid.
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the underlying assumption seemed to be that video conferencing is a positive 
development and that courts should have greater autonomy to direct its use. 
Ultimately, the recommended amendment was made in 2008 alongside a series 
of other reforms to the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure. Th e Osborne Report also 
referred positively to initiatives undertaken by the Court Services Division (the 
branch of Ontario’s Ministry of the Attorney General responsible for technology 
issues in the courts) since 2001, including the installation of video-conferencing 
equipment in fi fty-one court locations and the creation of a model electronic 
courtroom in Toronto “to service a high-volume commercial court and support 
large volumes of evidence, electronic evidence presentation and remote witness 
testimony, particularly in multi-jurisdictional hearings.”26 
In a speech marking the opening of the courts for 2008, Ontario’s then 
Attorney General echoed the Osborne Report’s call for reform in the province’s 
justice system, commenting: “We have the opportunity to take the same reformist 
approach that we apply to others, and apply it to ourselves. Society has gone 
from the encyclopedia to Google, from fax to Facebook, in less than fi ve years. 
Time is moving on. Th e challenges are now.”27 Similar sentiments are evident 
in Chief Justice Annemarie Bonkalo’s speech that marked the opening of the 
Ontario Court of Justice in 2010, wherein she noted: “Th e information technology 
revolution continues to off er new opportunities to improve service, access to 
justice and transparency.”28 
More recent government publications reveal continuing enthusiasm for 
video-conferencing technology. Th e 2010-2011 Annual Report of the Court 
Services Division of the Ministry of the Attorney General reports that “[t]he 
Court Services Division is committed to continually upgrading and enhancing 
the use of modern technology in support of the courts” and has “one of the largest 
high-speed videoconferencing networks in the world,” through which “the justice 
sector in Ontario leverages technology to increase access to justice for those in 
remote communities as well as within larger urban centres, minimizing the need 
for travel and eff ectively reducing the environmental impact of bringing people 
26. Ibid at 123.
27. Th e Honourable Chris Bentley, “Attorney General Addresses Opening of the Courts of 
Ontario for 2008” (Speech delivered at the Toronto Court House on 9 September 2008), 
online: Ministry of the Attorney General <http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/
news/2008/20080909-oc-sp.asp>.
28. Chief Justice Annemarie E Bonkalo, “2010 Opening of the Courts Speech” (Delivered at the 
Ontario Court of Justice on 14 September 2010), online: Ontario Court of Justice <http://
www.ontariocourts.ca/ocj/ocj/publications/2010-report-of-ontario-court-of-justice>.
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together.”29 Th e 2011-2012 Annual Report is equally enthusiastic, reporting, 
among other things, that “[w]ith the Northwest’s unique geographic challenges, 
video conferencing continues to increase access to justice across the region” 
and that one “[a]ccomplishment” in 2011-2012 was that the Court Services 
Division “[c]ommenced the planning phase of a pilot project for mobile video 
conferencing technology.”30
Advocacy bodies for the legal profession have likewise embraced court 
technologies. In its 1996 Systems of Civil Justice Task Force Report, the Canadian 
Bar Association took the position that “[t]he integration of modern computer, 
electronic, telephonic, and video technology in court operations is crucial to the 
creation of a viable multi-option civil justice system.”31 Th is report also contended 
that “[t]here is a large role for technology in assisting reform eff orts by increasing 
access and reducing costs”32 and that “the courts of the twenty-fi rst century should 
have the technological capacity to … incorporate interactive video technology into 
justice proceedings when warranted.”33 In 2007, the Ontario Bar Association held 
a stakeholder summit with the goal of developing recommendations for improving 
the accessibility of the legal justice system. Among its recommendations, the 
Association endorsed the continued use of video-conferencing technology in civil 
cases “to facilitate access to the court, especially in the more remote regions of the 
province.”34 Th e attitude towards video conferencing in these policy documents 
is captured in an article in the Canadian Bar Association’s National Magazine, 
which referred to video conferencing as “a positive tool that off ers effi  ciencies and 
opportunities that result in justice better served with less wait time.”35
In summary, a review of the policy discourse surrounding video-conferencing 
technology in particular and court technologies more generally reveals an almost 
exclusively evaluative focus on the ability of these technologies to perform their 
intended use. With the assumption that video-conferencing technology can 
provide cheaper, more convenient presentation of witness evidence at trial,36 the 
29. Ministry of the Attorney General, Court Services Division, Annual Report 2010-2011 
(Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General, 2011) at 48.
30. Ministry of the Attorney General, Court Services Division, Annual Report 2011-2012 
(Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General, 2012) at A15.
31. Canadian Bar Association, Systems of Civil Justice Task Force Report (Ottawa: Canadian Bar 
Association, 1996) at 60.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Ontario Bar Association, Getting It Right: Th e Report of the Ontario Bar Association Justice 
Stakeholder Summit (Edmonton: Canadian Forum on Civil Justice, 2008) at 11, 22. 
35. Katya Hodge, “Video Conferencing,” CBA National Magazine (September 2011) 11 at 11.
36. It should be noted that the accuracy of this assumption itself (or, at the very least, its 
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increased use of this technology is treated as a positive development. In this 
equation, effi  ciency is the guiding norm and improved access is repeatedly cited 
as the policy goal driving the desire for greater effi  ciency through increased use 
of technology. Th e overall attitude towards technology is optimistic and there is 
a sense of inevitability about further integration of technology in the civil justice 
system. As Ontario’s former Attorney General stated in his 2008 speech marking 
the opening of the courts, “[t]ime is moving on.”37  
II.  TOWARDS AN EVALUATIVE FRAMEWORK: 
PERSPECTIVES ON TECHNOLOGY
Embedded in the aforementioned policy discourse is an approach to technology 
that includes certain assumptions about technology and about society’s interaction 
with it. Th is approach can be seen as refl ecting a narrow instrumental view of 
technology. Much more could be (and, indeed, has been) said about instrumental 
and other competing perspectives on technology. My account is necessarily brief, 
highlighting particular features of an instrumental perspective as well as certain 
critiques of this perspective that assist in situating the remainder of my analysis.38
Andrew Feenburg describes the instrumental theories of technology as off ering 
“the most widely accepted view of technology.”39 Under this view, technology 
is treated as “completely neutral, solely serving the intended purposes held for 
it by its users”40 and as indiff erent to politics or social contexts.41 Moreover, the 
ability of humans to control technological outcomes is emphasized.42 As a result, our 
relationship with technology is presumed to be straightforward. Conventional views 
of technology, as Langdon Winner explains, include the following perspective:
universal accuracy) is not self-evident. See Asco Construction Ltd v Epoxy Solutions Inc, 2011 
ONSC 4464 at para 20, OJ No 3406 (QL) (determining “that it was less expensive to have the 
witnesses attend in person at trial than to have their evidence transmitted via video conference”).
37. Bentley, supra note 27.
38. As is refl ected in the text in this section and the accompanying citations, the framework 
outlined here draws heavily from work by Andrew Feenberg and Arthur J Cockfi eld 
discussing and contrasting instrumental and substantive theories or perspectives of 
technology.
39. Andrew Feenberg, Transforming Technology: A Critical Th eory Revisited, 2d ed (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002) at 5. See also, Arthur Cockfi eld & Jason Pridmore, “A 
Synthetic Th eory of Law and Technology” (2007) 8 Minn J L Sci & Tech 475 at 479.
40. Ibid at 480.
41. Feenburg, supra note 39 at 5, 6. See also ibid.
42. See e.g. Arthur J Cockfi eld, “Individual Autonomy, Law and Technology: Should Soft 
Determinism Guide Legal Analysis?” (2010) 30:1 Bulletin Sci Tech & Soc 4.
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Once things have been made, we interact with them on occasion to achieve certain 
specifi c purposes. One picks up a tool, uses it, and puts it down. One picks up a 
telephone, talks on it, and then does not use it for a time. A person gets on an airplane, 
fl ies from Point A to Point B, and then gets off . Th e proper interpretation of the 
meaning of technology in the mode of use seems to be nothing more complicated 
than an occasional, limited, and nonproblematic interaction.43
Given these features, it is not surprising that those holding an instrumental 
view “are often optimistic about technology”44 and often take the position that 
“technologies should be adopted as long as they promote an instrumental purpose 
that enhances effi  ciency.”45
Instrumental perspectives form a dichotomy with “substantive” perspectives 
on technology, which “emphasize the ways in which technological systems (or 
‘structure’) can have a substantive impact on individual and community interests 
that may diff er from technology’s intended impact.”46 Substantive theories of 
technology reject the proposition that technology is neutral and take a much 
more skeptical view of our capacity to exercise agency to control technology. 
Th e notion of “technological determinism” is often connected with substantive 
theories, wherein technology is framed “to greater or lesser extents, as inherently 
possessing a structure that in turn produces a society that must act or exist in 
certain ways.”47 For this reason, substantive theories risk criticism for “pay[ing] 
insuffi  cient heed to the importance of human agency.”48 A softer view of 
determinism can be found in Feenberg’s description of substantive theories of 
technology. He writes, “[T]he issue is not that machines have ‘taken over,’ but 
that in choosing to use them we make many unwitting commitments.”49 Similar 
sentiments, expressed more dramatically, can be found in the following oft-quoted 
passage written by Winner:
New technologies are institutional structures within an evolving constitution that 
gives shape to a new polity, the technopolis in which we do increasingly live. For 
the most part, this constitution still evolves with little public scrutiny or debate. 
Shielded by the conviction that technology is neutral and tool-like, a whole new 
43. Langdon Winner, “Technology as Forms of Life” in David M Kaplan, ed, Readings in 
the Philosophy of Technology (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefi eld, 2004) 103 at 104 [Winner, 
“Technology as Forms of Life”].
44. Cockfi eld & Pridmore, supra note 39 at 482.
45. Arthur J Cockfi eld, “Towards a Law and Technology Th eory” (2004) 30:3 Man LJ 383 at 
386, n 10.
46. Cockfi eld, supra note 42 at 4.
47. Cockfi eld & Pridmore, supra note 39 at 489.
48. Ibid at 498.
49. Feenburg, supra note 39 at 7.
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order is built—piecemeal, step by step, with the parts and pieces linked together in 
novel ways—without the slightest public awareness or opportunity to dispute the 
character of the changes underway. It is somnambulism (rather than determinism) 
that characterizes technological politics—on the left, right, and center equally.50
To be sure, setting up this dichotomy of instrumental and substantive 
perspectives is, as Arthur Cockfi eld acknowledges, “a reductionist way of looking 
at perspectives on technology, as each of these theoretical frames is far more 
complex than this dichotomy suggests.”51 Nonetheless, it is a helpful way to begin 
to think about what a defensible, nuanced perspective on technology might look 
like. Both Feenburg and Cockfi eld use the limitations associated with these two 
dichotomous perspectives as a jumping-off  point to developing their own unique 
theoretical accounts.
My account jumps off  from one of the major criticisms of an instrumental 
perspective, namely that it “tends to underappreciate the complex interaction 
between law, technology and human institutions that can lead to unanticipated 
and adverse social policy outcomes.”52 In other words, while instrumental 
perspectives provide “a prediction of the future based on the potentials for and 
use of new technology … they rarely problematize the technologies themselves.”53 
However, as Winner observes, “[i]f the experience of modern society shows us 
anything … it is that technologies are not merely aids to human activity, but also 
powerful forces acting to reshape that activity and its meaning.”54
Th e dominant policy discourse described above in Part I fails to problematize 
video-conferencing technology itself by focusing almost exclusively on the technical 
capacity of video conferencing to deliver cost and time savings. Th is is a serious 
shortcoming, in my view, because it excludes from the conversation potentially 
signifi cant consequences of the use of video-conferencing technology, including 
broader social and political implications. As expressed by Winner, “we [need to] 
pay attention not only to the making of physical instruments and processes … 
but also to the production of psychological, social and political conditions as part 
of any signifi cant technological change.”55
With a view to introducing some of these potentially signifi cant consequences 
into the conversation, in Part III I canvass how video conferencing, as a mediating 
50. Langdon Winner, Autonomous Technology: Technics-out-of-Control as a Th eme in Political 
Th ought (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1978) at 324.
51. Cockfi eld & Pridmore, supra note 39 at 494.
52. Ibid at 498.
53. Ibid at 481-82.
54. Winner, “Technologies as Forms of Life,” supra note 43 at 105.
55. Ibid at 112. 
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technology, may unintentionally interfere with assessments of witness credibility 
and impede emotional connections between courtroom participants. I also explore 
the potential broader legal and social implications. Following this, in Part IV, I 
change focus and examine the ways in which video conferencing—by disrupting 
the geography of adjudication—may threaten the solemnity associated with, and 
respect given to, the civil justice system.
III. UNINTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE: EFFECTS ON 
CREDIBILITY ASSESSMENTS AND EMOTIONAL 
CONNECTIVITY
As noted above in Part I, the dominant policy discourse with respect to video 
conferencing refl ects the view that video conferencing should be embraced 
because it enhances the effi  ciency of witness testimony delivery by reducing cost 
and increasing convenience. Underlying this view is the implicit assumption that 
video conferencing performs the task of transmitting remote testimony well. In 
the past, the idea that this technology could eff ectively transmit witness testimony 
was not without controversy. One of the most prominent arguments against 
video-conferencing technology was that technical issues—such as time delays 
and poor audio and picture quality—would impede the ability of the court and 
counsel to interact with and assess witnesses.56 Th e underlying concern was that 
these types of technical issues would aff ect the integrity of a legal proceeding by 
interfering with credibility assessments.
56. See the criminal case of R v Chapple, 2005 BCSC 383 at para 17, BCJ No 585 (QL). 
Th e court found that the poor quality of evidence received against an accused through a 
video-link—including a time delay between question and answers and “somewhat diffi  cult” 
audio—contributed to precluding the accused from making a full answer and defense. See 
e.g. Lorne Sossin & Zimra Yetnikoff , “I Can See Clearly Now: Videoconference Hearings and 
the Legal Limit on How Tribunals Allocate Resources” (2007) 25:2 Windsor YB Access Just 
247 at 259. Th e authors note two other cases where these types of problems were manifest: 
Videoconferencing technology may not always be of a standard high enough to guarantee fair-
ness. In R. v. Raj, the court agreed with the defendant’s assertion that the video link made it 
diffi  cult to assess body language and discern expressions. Furthermore, there was only a single 
camera angle available, and there was a delay between the questions and the witness’ answers. 
Th e court concluded that these defaults in the technology impaired the defendant’s ability to 
make full answer and defence and rejected the use of videoconferencing in that case. In R. v. 
Gates, the court concluded that video equipment which did not allow the parties to see and 
speak to each other simultaneously violated s. 650 of the Criminal Code, which requires the 
accused to be present at all stages of the trial.
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However, with improvements to video-conferencing technology in recent 
years, governments and the courts have expressed greater confi dence in the 
technical quality of the remote testimony received. As mentioned earlier, Justice 
Rutherford reports in Pack All Manufacturing that “a trial judge can see, hear and 
evaluate a witness’ testimony very well, assuming the video-conference arrangements 
are good.” He speculates that video conferencing might even provide a better 
view of witnesses than that available in a traditional courtroom.57 In a civil case 
heard in 2010, Justice Ray commented that “the technology for video links has 
improved enormously over recent years” and that the specifi c video-conferencing 
technology used in that case was “of excellent quality.”58 Likewise, a recent 
government announcement of a video-conferencing pilot project in Sandy Lake 
First Nation reports that “you are able to see, hear and carry on a meeting as if 
you were in the same room.”59 Th e impression left is that video-conferencing 
technology and in-person appearance can now be considered equally acceptable 
means of receiving evidence. 
What these accounts fail to recognize, however, is that beyond easily 
observable technical issues of picture quality and synchrony, there are good 
reasons that we should be concerned about using video-conferencing technology 
to transmit evidence. Notwithstanding technical improvements in the available 
technology, there remain risks of signifi cant unintended eff ects on both credibility 
assessments and on the emotional connections created between courtroom 
participants. In this Part, I examine these two types of potential unintended 
eff ects and canvass their broader legal and political implications.
A. CREDIBILITY ASSESSMENTS
Broadly, the concern in relation to credibility assessments is essentially McLuha-
nian: that the “medium is the message.” In Marshall McLuhan’s own words: 
… it is the medium that shapes and controls the scale and form of human 
association and action. Th e content or uses of such media are as diverse as 
they are ineff ectual in shaping the form of human association. Indeed, it is only too 
typical that the ‘content’ of any medium blinds us to the character of the medium.60
57. Pack All, supra note 7 at para 6.
58. Malenfant, supra note 18 at paras 2-3.
59. Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, “Sandy Lake First Nation Video-Conferencing 
Pilot Project,” online: <http://sandylake.fi rstnation.ca/system/fi les/Sandy Lake First Nation 
Video Conferencing Pilot Project Feb 2012.pdf>.
60. Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: Th e Extensions of Man (Cambridge, Mass: MIT 
Press, 1994) at 9.
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In his analysis of the use of video-conferencing technology in Immigration 
and Refugee Board hearings, Mark Federman draws on McLuhan’s work to explore 
how video conferencing—as a mediating technology—might aff ect the receipt 
and assessment of claimant testimony. Federman highlights a number of factors 
possibly at play, including “the eff ects of distortions in experiencing non-verbal 
communication, or those induced by shifted eye-contact (through non-alignment 
of viewing screen and camera angle)” and “the eff ects a video-mediated environment 
may have on encouraging or detecting deception.”61 Other research has traced 
how choice of camera shot—for example, a head shot versus a full body shot—or 
the lighting in a remote facility can aff ect how a witness is perceived in court 
and has outlined the limited ability of video-conferencing technology to capture 
nonverbal cues.62 In short, there is compelling evidence that “every technological 
choice will infl uence the way … [a witness] is perceived, often in ways that cannot 
be precisely predicted or reliably controlled.”63  
Video conferencing, as a mediating technology, may impede assessments of 
credibility in subtle, but important ways.64 In one oft-cited study,65 the authors 
61. Mark Federman, “On the Media Eff ects of Immigration and Refugee Board Hearings via 
Videoconference” (2006) 19:4 J Refugee Stud 433 at 436. Other commentators have raised 
similar issues. See e.g. Michael D Roth, “Laissez-Faire Videoconferencing: Remote Witness 
Testimony and Adversarial Truth” (2000) 48:1 UCLA L Rev 185 at 198. Roth observes that, 
Nobody claims that “[v]ideo images are ... adequate substitutes of live interactions.” Like tele-
vision, video does not accurately simulate human perceptions. Both mediums can exaggerate 
certain personal traits that are commonly used to evaluate a witness’s demeanor such as blem-
ishes, shadows, and hair growth. Filming can add weight or emphasize scars. “When a person 
is viewed in the unnatural conditions imposed on him by [a video medium], many of [the] 
usual clues to his character are [altered]” [footnotes omitted].
62. See Elizabeth Wiggins, “What We Know and What We Need to Know About the Eff ects 
of Courtroom Technology,” (2004) 12:3 Wm & Mary Bill Rts J 731 at 737. Wiggins cites 
the program of research conducted by Daniel Lassiter and his colleagues on videotaped 
confessions, which concluded that “evaluations of videotaped confessions can be signifi cantly 
altered by seemingly inconsequential changes in the camera perspective when confessions are 
initially recorded.” See also, Anne Bowen Poulin, “Criminal Justice and Videoconferencing 
Technology: Th e Remote Defendant” (2004) 78:4 Tul L Rev 1089, at 1108-11. For 
discussion about the possible eff ects of lighting and background on how a witness will 
be perceived, see e.g. David Tait et al, “Gateways to Justice: Improving Video-mediated 
Communications for Justice Participants’ Project Progress Update 15 June 2009,” online: 
<http://www.justiceenvironments.edu.au/attachments/progress-report-15-june-2009-2.
p0.pdf>. See also, the discussion in Susan J Drucker & Janice Platt Hunold, “Videotaped 
Depositions: Th e Media Perspective” (1988) 60:1 Ny St BJ 38, 42-44.
63. Poulin, supra note 62 at 1120.
64. Ibid at 1114-15.
65. Gail S Goodman et al, “Face-to-Face Confrontation: Eff ects of Closed-Circuit Technology 
on Children’s Eyewitness Testimony and Jurors’ Decisions” (1998) 22:2 L and Hum Behav 
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concluded, among other things, that “[c]hildren who testifi ed via CCTV [closed 
circuit television] were viewed as less believable than children who testifi ed in 
regular trials, despite the fact that, if anything, children who testifi ed via CCTV 
were more accurate.”66 Based on these observations, the authors recommended 
that “due to jurors’ negative biases towards child witnesses when CCTV was 
employed, attorneys may choose to leave closed-circuit testimony for the most 
extreme circumstances.”67
To be sure, other studies have reported more encouraging results when it 
comes to assessing the credibility of a remote witness. For example, some 
experiments have shown that juries react similarly to experts who testify remotely 
as they do to experts who provide their evidence while physically in the courtroom.68 
Moreover, it bears noting that the above-quoted study on child witnesses and 
CCTV technology also concluded that the technology “generally promoted 
more accurate testimony in children”69 and that the fi ndings did not support 
the proposition that the use of the technology impairs the ability of fact-fi nders 
to evaluate the accuracy of child witnesses.70 Ultimately, however, there remain 
many questions regarding the unintended eff ects of video-conferencing technology 
on credibility assessments. Th e literature is rife with calls for more research.71
165. Th is study has been cited repeatedly in the literature relating to video-conferencing 
technology. See e.g. Poulin, supra note 62; Shari Seidman Diamond et al, “Effi  ciency and 
Cost: Th e Impact of Videoconferenced Hearings on Bail Decisions” (2010) 100 J Crim L 
& Criminology 869; Molly Treadway Johnson & Elizabeth Wiggins “Videoconferencing in 
Criminal Proceedings: Legal and Empirical Issues and Directions for Research” (2006) 28 
Law & Pol’y 211.
66. Goodman et al, supra note 65 at 199. 
67. Ibid.
68. See Frederic Lederer, “Th e Legality and Practicality of Remote Witness Testimony” (2009) 
20:5 Prac Litigator 19 at 21. Lederer explains: 
Insofar as the CLCT has been able to ascertain, remote appearances appear to be treated 
by courtroom participants just as if those persons were physically in the courtroom. Some 
years ago we conducted two separate scientifi cally controlled experiments conducted over two 
academic years under the supervision of then William & Mary psychology professor Kelly 
Shaver. Th ey demonstrated that in civil personal injury jury trials in which damage verdicts 
relied upon the testimony of medical experts, there was no statistically signifi cant diff erence 
in verdict whether the experts were physically in the courtroom or elsewhere, at least so long 
as witness images are displayed life-size behind the witness stand and the witness is subject to 
cross-examination under oath. Years of non-controlled experiments in criminal Laboratory 
Trials suggest that the same result applies to merits witnesses in criminal cases.
69. Goodman et al, supra note 65 at 197.
70. Ibid at 198.
71. See e.g. Johnson & Wiggins, supra note 65. 
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B. EMOTIONAL CONNECTIONS
A second set of issues relates to the impact of the technology on the ability of 
courtroom participants to connect emotionally with witnesses. In a study performed 
outside the courtroom context, researchers concluded that persons form less 
positive impressions in interactions with colleagues mediated through video-
conferencing technology than in face-to-face interactions.72 As Anne Bowen Poulin 
reports, “Th ere is ample evidence that one eff ect of video is to make the person 
portrayed harder for the audience to relate to.”73 In the legal context, the concern 
is, stated generally, that the use of technology risks creating a “dehumanizing”74 
barrier between the remote witness and those physically present in the courtroom. 
A chilling example can be found in a 2005 report regarding the use of video 
conferencing to conduct hearings for detained immigrants in removal proceedings 
in Chicago. One of the trained observers participating in the study noted the 
indiff erence displayed by the lawyers and the judges in the video-conference 
hearings and cited the following example:
[Th e immigrant on the video] was sobbing. She looked like she was a teenager. No 
one even noticed how stressed out she was. Everyone was stapling exhibits and passing 
papers, and then it was over … . No one explained why … [the case] was being 
continued. Her usual attorney wasn’t there. It seems like her condition might 
have had more of an impact had she been in the courtroom, but no one even 
noticed her.75
In addition to qualitative observations like this, a number of quantitative 
studies suggest that individuals who appear in court via video conferencing are 
at risk of receiving harsher treatment from judges or other adjudicators. For 
example, one study on the use of video conferencing in asylum removal hearings 
reported that the use of this technology “roughly doubles to a statistically signifi cant 
degree the likelihood that an applicant will be denied asylum.”76 Similarly, a study 
72. John Storck & Lee Sproull, “Th rough a Glass Darkly: What Do People Learn in Video-
Conferences” (1995) 22:2 Hum Comm Res 197.
73. Poulin, supra note 62 at 1118.
74. Johnson & Wiggins, supra note 65 at 215. See also Aaron Haas, “Videoconferencing in 
Immigration Proceedings” (2006) 5:1 Pierce L Rev 59 at 74-77; Frank M Walsh & Edward 
M Walsh, “Eff ective Processing or Assembly-Line Justice? Th e Use of Teleconferencing in 
Asylum Removal Hearings” (2008) 22:2 Geo Immig LJ 259 at 269-70.
75. Th e Legal Assistance Foundation Metropolitan Chicago & Chicago Appleseed Fund for 
Justice, Videoconferencing in Removal Proceedings: A Case Study of the Chicago Immigration 
Court (2005), online: <http://chicagoappleseed.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/
videoconfreport_080205.pdf>. See also Haas, supra note 74 at 78.
76. Walsh & Walsh, supra note 74 at 259. 
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analysing a Cook County, Illinois, program mandating that certain bail hearings 
be held via video conference noted that defence counsel repeatedly criticized the 
system as “a grossly demeaning ‘cattle call.’”77 Th e study reported on empirical 
research that showed, among other things, that “[f ]or all combined off enses that 
shifted to televised bail hearings, [the change in the average bail amount] … was 
an increase of roughly $20,958 or 51%.”78 Although the authors of the article 
note that the possible reasons behind this result are complex—and may include 
the eff ects of poor equipment79—they also cautioned that there may be “something 
about the presence of a live individual that cannot be replicated, even with 
modern technology.”80
Th e potential that video-conferencing technology will impede emotional 
connections between courtroom participants and foster harsher interactions that 
impact outcomes is of particular concern in criminal and immigration proceedings 
where individuals are detained and their liberty is at stake. However, this risk 
should also concern us in the context of less serious criminal proceedings and in 
civil proceedings where the stakes are arguably lower. Th ese proceedings are still 
an integral part of our justice system and impact the lives of individuals.81
Judith Resnik and Dennis Curtis explore how the phenomenon of “adjudication 
can itself be [understood as] … a kind of democratic practice.”82 Under this account, 
public adjudication manifests itself as a democratic practice in several respects. For 
example, the public nature of adjudication through open court proceedings can 
be seen as enabling people to observe and contest the exercise of public and 
77. Diamond et al, supra note 65 at 885. 
78. Ibid at 892.
79. Ibid at 898-99. Regarding the quality of the equipment, the authors observed, inter alia, 
that “[t]he picture quality and sound available today are far superior to the technology that 
existed when the equipment was installed in Cook County” and that the placement of the 
equipment resulted in defendants possibly looking as if they were intentionally avoiding eye 
contact.
80. Ibid at 900.
81. See Judith Resnik and Dennis Curtis, Representing Justice: Invention, Controversy, and Rights 
in City-States and Democratic Courtrooms (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011) at 301: 
What is the utility of having a window into the mundane [as well as the dramatic]? Th at is 
where people live, and that is where state control can be both useful and yet overreaching. 
Th e dense and tedious repetition of ordinary exchanges is where one fi nds the enormity of the 
power of both bureaucratic states and private sector actors. Th at power is at risk of operating 
unseen. Th e redundancy of various claims of right and the processes, allegations, and behav-
iors that become the predicates to judgments can fuel debate not only about the responses in 
particular cases but also about what the underlying norms ought to be. 
82. Judith Resnik, “Bring Back Bentham: ‘Open Courts,’ ‘Terror Trials,’ and Public Sphere(s)” 
(2011) 5:1 L & Ethics of Human Rights 1 at 53. 
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private power as well as participate in the elaboration and reconfi guration of 
norms. By seeing the law in action, “the public and the immediate participants 
can see that law varies by context, decisionmakers, litigants and facts … [and] 
gain a chance to argue that the governing rules or their applications are wrong.”83 
Importantly for the purposes of the analysis in this section, Resnik and Curtis 
explore adjudication as a process that can dignify litigants by “engender[ing] 
participatory obligations and enact[ing] democratic precepts of equality.”84 Public 
adjudication, they write, is “an odd moment in which individuals can oblige 
others to treat them as equals as they argue in public about their disagreements, 
misbehavior, wrongdoing, and obligations. Litigation forces dialogue on the 
unwilling (including the government) and momentarily alters confi gurations of 
authority.”85 Th e aspiration to participatory parity—the exhortation to audi 
et alteram partem (to hear the other side)—is another way, according to these 
authors, that courts can be “a great leveler.”86 If video-conferencing technology 
interferes with emotional connections between courtroom participants, there is 
good reason to be concerned that it threatens democratic aspirations to such parity. 
In other words, if those physically present in the courtroom have diffi  culties relating 
to remote witnesses and, in turn, those witnesses fi nd the process of testifying 
dehumanizing, the function of courts as “potentially egalitarian venues” is 
undermined.87 In addition to implicating democratic values, the legitimacy of the 
legal system is possibly at risk. As Daniel Markovits has observed: 
[T]here exists substantial evidence that people’s compliance with the law, as it is applied 
to them, depends signifi cantly on their judgments concerning the legitimacy of 
authorities who apply it, and that judgments concerning legitimacy, in turn, depend 
on judgments concerning the procedures that the authorities employ in determining 
what law requires, and especially in resolving disputes about this.88 
If this is indeed true and if the use of video-conferencing technology results 
in participants having a diminished subjective sense of inclusion in the legal process, 
83. Resnik & Curtis, supra note 81 at 304. As the authors elaborate, “our argument is that … 
[adjudication] off ers opportunities for democratic norms to be implemented through the 
millions of exchanges in courts among judges, the audience and the litigants ... courts are an 
important component of functioning democracies seeking to demonstrate legitimacy through 
displaying what qualities of governance are valued.”
84. Ibid at 301.
85. Ibid at 303.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid at 304.
88. Daniel Markovits, A Modern Legal Ethics: Adversary Advocacy in a Democratic Age (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2008) at 189 [footnotes omitted].
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then there is good reason to see the use of this technology as a risk vis-à-vis legitimacy 
accorded to the legal system by the public.
Th ese concerns regarding risks to democratic values and the legitimacy of 
the legal system are compounded when one considers that video-conferencing 
technology has been viewed as a panacea for addressing access to justice problems 
faced by northern Canadian communities.89 Many of these northern communities 
include signifi cant Aboriginal populations, members of which face systemic 
discrimination in the justice system and experience signifi cantly disproportionate 
levels of illness, poverty, unemployment, and incarceration. Although video-
conferencing technology holds promise in making access to the courts more 
convenient and more aff ordable for northern populations, the quality of this 
access is an important consideration that needs to be part of the equation. To the 
extent that these communities are already marginalized in relation to the exercise 
of political and legal power in Canada, the fact that these communities may 
disproportionately experience the possible negative eff ects of court technologies 
on the quality of adjudication is a critical concern.90
C. MANAGING RISK
One obvious response to concerns about the unintended eff ects of video-
conferencing technology on assessments of credibility and on the formation of 
emotional connections is to conduct more research on this issue in order to 
better understand these phenomena and to allow decision makers to modify 
their behaviour accordingly, perhaps by developing a series of best practices for 
diff erent contexts. Th e studies cited above did not involve a review of the use of 
video-conferencing technology in Ontario’s civil justice system; rather, they studied 
89. I thank Jane Bailey for bringing this particular concern to my attention. In the Australian 
context, Anne Wallace has helpfully written about the importance of taking into account the 
specifi c social and cultural context of using video conferencing in Aboriginal communities 
in remote Australia. See e.g. Anne Wallace, “‘Virtual Justice in the Bush’: Th e Use of Court 
Technology in Remote and Regional Australia” (2008) 19:1 J L Inf & Sci 1.
90. See e.g. Ont CJR First Report, supra note 5. Th is report states:
Finally, we believe that the use of video conferencing has particular potential to benefi t 
members of the public, the Bar, administrators and judges in the northern parts of Ontario. 
Distances defi ne the North. All of the characteristics which make video conferencing attractive 
in any environment, make it doubly so for those who must have access to the courts in the 
North East and North West Regions of the Province. 
 See also British Columbia Ministry of the Attorney General, “Courts innovate with 
videoconferencing solutions” (22 December 2011), online: BC Government Online News 
Source <http://www.newsroom.gov.bc.ca/2011/12/courts-innovate-with-videoconferencing-
solutions.html>.
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very diff erent contexts and diff erent, often inferior, technological equipment.91 In 
short, there is much we do not know about the possible eff ects of using the 
technology that is available today in this province’s civil courts. 
Th e question remains, however, of what to do in the interim while this 
research is being conducted. Because of the democratic values at play and the 
potentially vulnerable populations involved, I argue that caution is warranted. 
In his study on the impact of video-conferencing technology on the Mexican 
immigrant community in the United States, Eugenio Mollo Jr. bluntly warns that 
“since we do not know the defi nite human consequences of [video-conferencing] 
technology, using immigrants as the guinea pigs of this trial technology distorts 
our legal history and threatens our commitment to equal justice under the law.”92 
We would be well advised, in my view, to heed this warning.
Even with greater study, it is important to acknowledge that there will 
likely be signifi cant unintended eff ects of transmitting evidence through video 
conferencing. As Federman cautions, “[W]hile awareness … is the fi rst step 
in mitigating the unperceived infl uences of a medium’s [unintended] eff ects, 
awareness alone is not suffi  cient to eliminate them; indeed it is unlikely in the 
extreme that they can be eliminated from human cognition.”93 Stated more 
simply, “[n]obody claims that ‘[v]ideo images are … adequate substitutes of live 
interactions.”94 At least with the technology available today, it seems inevitable 
that the tasks of assessing credibility and providing testimony will be experienced 
diff erently when video-conferencing technology is used. Moreover, as Kathryn 
Leader points out, “As long as jurors and legal practitioners believe the ideal 
means to obtain the best evidence is ‘live’, [the use of video-conferencing] … 
risks harming a witness’s credibility.95 In other words, for the time being, video-
conferencing technology would seem to be an unavoidably non-neutral means of 
delivering witness testimony.
Acknowledging this reality gives rise to questions about our ability to 
assess witnesses’ evidence in general. It is helpful to keep in mind that concerns 
relating to credibility assessments, in particular, are in large part rooted in 
91. See e.g. discussions regarding the eff ects of the use of inferior equipment in Storck & Sproull, 
supra note 72 at 199-200; Shari Seidman Diamond et al, supra note 65 at 898-899.
92. Eugenio Mollo, Jr, “Th e Expansion of Video Conferencing Technology in Immigration 
Proceedings and Its Impact on Venue Provisions, Interpretation Rights, and the Mexican 
Immigrant Community” (2006) 9:3 J Gender Race & Just 689 at 695.
93. Federman, supra note 61 at 436.
94. Roth, supra note 61 at 198. 
95. Kathryn Leader, “Closed-Circuit Television Testimony: Liveness and Truth-telling” (2010) 
14:1 Law Text Culture 312 at 327 [Leader, “Closed-Circuit Television Testimony”].
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assumptions about the value of demeanour evidence. Th at is, we care about how 
video-conferencing technology aff ects our visual perceptions of witnesses because 
we believe that demeanour tells us something important about their testimony. 
Th e value of demeanour evidence has itself been seriously questioned, and an 
evolving conversation is now taking place about the wisdom of its continued use. 
Studies have revealed the perils of demeanour evidence, including, most starkly, 
that even trained professionals “did no better than chance” in detecting deception 
from demeanour.96 Moreover, judges have taken note of this peril and cautioned 
against too much reliance on demeanour evidence in assessing the credibility of 
witnesses.97 Th is broader questioning of the usefulness of demeanour evidence 
has often been overlooked or treated cursorily in considerations of the use of video-
conferencing technology. As observed by Kathryn Leader, “attempts to assess 
what is problematic about … [video-conferenced testimony] fail also to query 
what might be problematic about live testimony.”98 
In order for further research into the eff ects of video-conferencing technology 
on credibility assessments to be optimally useful, such research should directly 
confront the value (or lack thereof ) of demeanour evidence more generally. If this 
occurs, one potential result is that demeanour evidence will no longer be seen as 
central to assessments of witness testimony. Although such a development would 
diminish concerns in relation to how video-conferencing technology interacts 
with our ability to assess demeanour, it would also introduce signifi cant broader 
consequences, including changes to well-established rules of evidence and appellate 
96. Paul Ekman, Telling Lies: Clues to Deceit in the Marketplace, Politics, and Marriage (New 
York: WW Norton and Company, 1992) at 285. See also, Natasha Bakht, “Objection, Your 
Honour! Accommodating Niqab-Wearing Women in Courtrooms” in Grillo et al, eds, Legal 
Practice and Cultural Diversity (London: Ashgate, 2008) 115 at 118-123 (discussing the perils 
of relying on demeanour evidence).
97. See e.g. Cuthbert v TD Canada Trust, [2010] ONSC 830, OJ No 630 (QL) (per Karakatsanis 
J, “courts have long recognized that demeanour can be misleading and is but one factor 
in assessing credibility”). See also Canadian Judicial Council, Model Jury Instructions, 
Preliminary Instructions at 4.11, online: Canadian Judicial Council <http://ww w.cjc-ccm.
gc.ca/cmslib/general/jury-instructions/NCJI%20Jury%20Instruction%20Preliminary%20
revised%20201 2-06%20E.pdf>. Th ese model jury instructions advise the judge to ask the 
jury: 
What was the witness’s manner when he or she testifi ed? Do not jump to conclusions, however, 
based entirely on the witness’s manner. Looks can be deceiving. Giving evidence in a trial is not 
a common experience for many witnesses. People react and appear diff erently. Witnesses come 
from diff erent backgrounds. Th ey have diff erent intellects, abilities, values, and life experi-
ences. Th ere are simply too many variables to make the manner in which a witness testifi es the 
only or the most important factor in your decision.
98. Leader, “Closed-Circuit Television Testimony,” supra note 95 at 324.
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standards of review where demeanour evidence plays a central role. As the 
Ontario Court of Appeal observed in R v NS:
Appellate deference is justifi ed to a signifi cant extent on the accepted wisdom that 
trial judges and juries have an advantage over appeal judges in assessing factual questions 
because they, unlike appeal judges, have seen and heard the witnesses. Similarly, 
the principled approach to the admission of hearsay evidence recognizes the value, 
insofar as the assessment of reliability is concerned, in the trier of fact’s ability to 
observe the witness’s demeanour as the witness made a statement which is proff ered 
as evidence of its truth.99
Seen in this light, the use of video conferencing to receive witness testimony 
has potentially broad implications for the civil justice system. However, these 
remain hidden in the absence of a serious and detailed consideration of how 
video conferencing, as a mediating technology, aff ects how we relate to each other 
in adjudicatory environments.
IV. CHANGING SPACE, CHANGING ADJUDICATION
In Part III, the analysis focused on how the act of transmitting evidence through 
video-conferencing technology may aff ect witness testimony. In this Part, I shift 
my focus and explore how the act of removing witnesses from the courtroom may 
aff ect the adjudicatory process. More specifi cally, I consider the ways in which 
video conferencing, by disrupting the geography of adjudication, may threaten 
the solemnity associated with, and respect given to, the civil justice system. As 
with the risks described in Part III, I argue that the risks described in this Part 
require our attention as they implicate democratic values and raise fundamental 
questions about the future of our adjudicatory processes.
A. VIDEO CONFERENCING AND THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE COURTROOM
Consideration of how the receipt of video-conferenced evidence might aff ect 
the adjudicatory process generally begins and ends with a reference to “the 
conventional rule”100 or “general principle”101 that witnesses give their evidence 
99. R v NS, [2010] ONCA 670 at para 56, OJ No 4306 (QL). See also, Henry H Perritt, Jr, 
“Video Depositions, Transcripts and Trials” (1994) 43:3 Emory L J 1071 at 1087-88, 1092-
93 (describing how “[g]reater use of electronic formats can change the relationship between 
trial and appellate courts” and how the introduction of video gives rise to a need to change 
rules of civil procedure, rules of criminal procedure, rules of evidence and appellate rules) 
[footnotes omitted].
100. Pack All, supra note 7 at para 9.
101. See Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 4.
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in person in the courtroom. Th is convention, of course, predates the existence of 
video-conferencing technology and the possibility that a witness could provide 
oral evidence in an interactive and immediate fashion from outside the courtroom. 
In a number of respects, video-conferencing technology replicates features of viva 
voce in-court testimony that have been deemed important: “A witness can see 
and be seen … hear and be heard immediately … is still under oath and must 
still account for his or her evidence … [and] must be in a designated place at a 
specifi c time.”102 Given that this is the case, why be concerned about how video 
conferencing aff ects adjudicatory practices? More specifi cally, “how much is the 
live trial to do with bodies sharing the same space at the same time?”103
One useful starting point is to acknowledge that courts have been fundamentally 
understood (and realized) in relation to bounded physical space for a very long time. 
As Judy Radul writes, “[t]he court is bound to site.”104 Although the courtroom 
may be a “relatively recent invention,” bounded adjudicative space is not. Courts 
have a long history of being held in single, designated spaces imbued with special 
meaning.105 Th e use of video-conferencing technology breaks with this history. 
It is not simply that the physical environment of adjudication is changing, 
for example, from under a tree to a brick courthouse. Video-conferencing 
technology opens up the possibility of multiple, simultaneous, and interactive 
sites of adjudication. Th is is something entirely new, bringing with it a new 
set of challenges.
102. Leader, supra note 95 at 318.
103. Ibid.
104. Judy Radul, “What Was Behind Me Faces Me - Performance, Staging and Technology in the 
Court of Law,” online: <http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2007-05-02-radul-en.html>.
105. Richard Mohr, “In Between Power and Procedure: Where the Court Meets the Public 
Sphere” (1999) 1 J of Soc Change & Crit Inquiry, online: <http://pandora.nla.gov.au/nph-
arch/2000/Z2000-Jan-24/http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/joscci/mohr.html>. As Mohr notes: 
Dating back to Ancient Greece, courts have been held in special places. Homer described the 
‘polished stones in a sacred circle’ which defi ned the place where the elders decided disputes. 
In the twentieth century, it is still possible to consider courts as a sacred circle, though diff erent 
signs now distinguish them from the profane world outside. Robert Jacob has described the 
evolution of the modern European court, from the place of justice signifi ed by a tree and an 
enclosure of hazel branches, to the timber panelling characteristic of more recent courtrooms. 
Legal doctrine itself demands the court be fi xed in place, from the Magna Carta’s dictum that 
‘Ordinary lawsuits shall not follow the royal court around, but shall be held in a fi xed place,’ 
to the modern requirement that courts sit at a ‘proclaimed place’. 
...
Major tensions arise, in courthouse architecture and in law, between the place of the court and 
the other places of which the court must take account: the sites of crimes or injuries, places 
where witnesses are, and places accessible to the public.
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Th ese challenges can be understood in a number of diff erent ways. One 
approach is to consider the legal geography at play and the relationship of bounded 
adjudicative space to the adjudicatory process. In her work examining video-
conferencing technology in the English context, Linda Mulcahy has thoughtfully 
explored how the physical environment in which testimony is given “plays a critical 
role in reinforcing the importance of the trial and the role of state-sanctioned 
adjudication.”106 One manifestation of this role, as Mulcahy notes, can be seen 
in “journeys to the trial.”107 Th at is, for courtroom participants the very act of 
travelling to the courthouse to participate in proceedings can be transformative 
due to the physical surroundings experienced during this journey. Visual cues 
created by, for example, the distance that a court is set back from a busy street 
or the design of the entrance to the courthouse can be used to “reinforce the 
fact that going to court is not an ordinary or everyday occurrence.”108 Indeed, as 
Mulcahy observes, offi  cial design guides for courts have taken note of this reality. 
In these guides, general exhortations such as the proposition that “courthouses 
must be planned and designed to frame, facilitate, and mediate the encounter 
between the citizen and the justice system”109 can be found, as can more specifi c 
guidance like the assertion that “the main entrance and entrance hall require a civic 
presence to refl ect the status of law in society and engender respect for decisions 
made in the courts.”110 If witnesses no longer attend court but rather provide their 
106. Linda Mulcahy, “Th e Unbearable Lightness of Being? Shifts Towards the Virtual Trial” 
(2008) 35:4 J L & Soc’y 464 at 478-479 [Mulcahy, “Unbearable Lightness”]. See also, Linda 
Mulcahy, Legal Architecture: Justice, Due Process and the Place of Law (New York: Routledge, 
1997) [Mulcahy, Legal Architecture]. See also, Linda Mulcahy, “Architects of Justice: Th e 
Politics of Courtroom Design” (2007) 16:3 Soc & L Stud 383.
107. Mulcahy, “Unbearable Lightness,” supra note 106 at 477-79.
108. Ibid at 477-78.
109. Judicial Conference of the United States, U.S. Courts Design Guide (2007) at 3-1 [US 
Courts Design Guide]. Th is phrase appears within a longer description of design goals that 
reads in part: 
Th e architecture of federal courthouses must promote respect for the tradition and purpose 
of the American judicial process. To this end, a courthouse facility must express solemnity, 
integrity, rigor, and fairness. Th e facility must also provide a civic presence and contribute to 
the architecture of the local community. 
Courthouses must be planned and designed to frame, facilitate, and mediate the encounter 
between the citizen and the justice system. All architectural elements must be proportional and 
arranged hierarchically to signify orderliness. Th e materials employed must be consistently ap-
plied, be natural and regional in origin, be durable, and invoke a sense of permanence. Colors 
should be subdued to complement the natural materials used in the design.
110. Mulcahy, “Unbearable Lightness,” supra note 106 at 478. Mulcahy notes the advice given 
to architects in UK, Ministry of Justice, Court Standards and Design Guide (London: Her 
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testimony remotely using video-conferencing technology, such visual cues will 
be unseen and unheeded. Th e traditional relationship between court participants 
and the geography and architecture of the court is disrupted. In this manner, 
video-conferencing technology may be understood as potentially infl uencing the 
cultural meaning associated with adjudicatory processes. 
B. CONSIDERING SOLEMNITY
Th e idea that physical presence and the physical environment of the court room 
are important is often connected to the concept of solemnity. A number of 
authors have framed their concerns with video-conferencing technology in terms of 
how “virtual trials threaten the solemnity of the courtroom.”111 Speaking from a 
judicial perspective, former US District Court Judge Nancy Gertner has written about 
the impact of video-conferenced testimony on the “gravitas” of the courtroom 
and queried, “In the fi nal analysis, should trials have the look and feel of the 
television evening news?”112 Canadian courts have, to some extent, acknowledged 
the potential for video-conferencing technology to disrupt the solemnity associated 
with conventional trial practices. In R v Allen,113 Justice Duncan recognized the 
objection that the “entire truth seeking process suff ers by permitting the witness 
to ‘mail it in’—to give evidence at a distance without his being brought into the 
presence of those he is accusing and the solemn and majestic atmosphere of the 
courthouse.”114 In discussing the principles to be applied when considering whether 
a witness should be permitted to provide evidence in a criminal case through a 
video link, Justice Gorman recently noted that “the Court must, in considering 
Majesty’s Courts Service, 2010), an 830 page document providing detailed guidance on the 
physical appearance and layout of Crown, county and magistrates’ courts in the UK: 
Th e main entrance and entrance hall require a civic presence to refl ect the status of Law in so-
ciety and engender respect for decisions made in the courts. Th is can be achieved by being the 
focus of the townscape, through symmetry and formality in the architecture, through a gener-
ous use of space and height internally and by the use of steps to the entrance … there should 
also be a generous external gathering space outside the entrance. Th e main entrance should 
symbolically be the image of the court, and the place outside which the Press photograph those 
seeking publicity after a case.
111. See e.g. Sossin & Yetnikoff , supra note 56 at 262; Nancy Gertner “Videoconferencing: 
Learning Th rough Screens” (2004) 12:3 Wm & Mary Bill Rts J 769 at 773.
112. Ibid at 784. Justice Gertner further observes: 
We are used to looking at screens, in our bedrooms and living rooms, our offi  ces, the train 
station, in restaurants. Th e court, however, is diff erent as seen with ‘the formality that attaches 
to the ceremony, the robed judge, the witness’ oath, the public’s scrutiny, the creation of an 
appellate record formed in a moment experienced simultaneously by all the parties.”
113. 2007 ONCJ 209, OJ No 1780 (QL).
114. Ibid at para 28. 
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the location from which the evidence will be presented, consider whether the 
witness will face the same level of solemnity off ered by a courtroom.”115
Underlying the above comments is recognition of the deep role that 
physical instantiations of ritual have historically played in relation to adjudicatory 
processes. Although sites of adjudication have not always involved what we now 
take as the paradigmatic adjudication location—bricks and mortar single-use 
courthouses—“[w]here a chosen site for adjudication has no extraordinary 
characteristics which mark it out as legal space it is often ritual rather than location 
which render the proceedings signifi cant.”116 Just as video-conferencing technology 
alters the interaction that court participants have with the physical geography of 
the courthouse, it also changes the nature of the court ritual—a ritual that has 
traditionally relied on the presence of witnesses to imbue the court with meaning 
and authority.
C. IMPLICATIONS OF THE VIRTUAL COURTHOUSE
As was the case with the risks to credibility assessments and emotional connectivity 
identifi ed in Part III, possible ways to manage risks to the solemnity of court 
processes associated with taking witnesses out of the courtroom can be identifi ed. 
One seemingly straightforward measure would be to take steps to infuse the remote 
location where the video-conferencing testimony is being given with some of the 
gravitas that can typically be seen in physical courtrooms. A precedent can be 
found in a video conferencing Practice Direction adopted by England in its civil 
procedure rules. Among other things, the Practice Direction provides that “[w]hen 
used for the taking of evidence, the objective should be to make the [video-
conferencing] session as close as possible to the usual practice in a trial court where 
evidence is taken in open court.”117 To this end, the Practice Direction specifi es, 
among other things, that “if the local site is not a courtroom, but a conference 
room or a studio, the judge will need to determine who is to sit where,” and that 
the “arranging party should make arrangements, if practicable, for the royal court 
of arms to be placed above the judge’s seat.”118 Further, in cases involving public 
trial proceedings, the arranging party must also ensure that the local site (if a studio 
or conference room rather than a courtroom) “provides suffi  cient accommodation 
115. R v Osmond, [2010] NJ No 54 at para 19 (QL), CanLII 6535 (Prov Ct).
116. Mulcahy, “Legal Architecture,” supra note 106 at 27.
117. Th e Civil Procedure Rules 1998, SI 1998/3132 (L 17) at PD 32, Annex 3, para 3 [Th e Civil 
Procedure Rules].
118. Ibid at paras 12,14.
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to enable a reasonable number of members of the public to attend.”119 Regarding 
the actual conduct of the hearing, the Practice Direction dictates that the judge 
“will determine who is to control the cameras” and “decide whether court dress is 
appropriate when using [video conferencing facilities].”120 Another example can 
be found in the Practice Direction published by the District Court of Western 
Australia regarding evidence taken via video link. Although the Australian Practice 
Direction speaks in more general terms than the English Practice Direction, it 
does specify that the party who intends to call a witness through video-conferencing 
technology must “use reasonable endeavours to ensure that … [the witness is] 
dressed appropriately for court, as if the witness was giving evidence in person in 
the court room; [and that] the arrangements made with the venue from which 
the video link or audio link is to be broadcast maintain the dignity and solemnity 
of the court, consistent with the venue being treated as part of the court for this 
purpose.”121 Even with these types of measures, however, it is readily apparent that 
video-conferenced testimony takes place in a signifi cantly diff erent environment 
than in-court testimony. Practice directions and protocols may mitigate some 
of the diff erences but they cannot replicate all of the subtle eff ects of the geography 
of the courthouse. Whether this is a good or a bad thing is not entirely straightforward.
On the one hand, there is good reason why we would want to engender 
respect in adjudicatory processes. As the Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly 
emphasized, public confi dence in the justice system underwrites both the eff ective 
administration of justice and the rule of law.122 From a more theoretical standpoint, 
if public adjudication refl ects and promotes democratic values, as is contended in 
Resnik and Curtis’ account of adjudication as a democratic practice,123 the increasing 
use of video-conferencing technology can be seen as a loss for democracy if it 
diminishes public adjudication by disrupting the solemnity and gravitas of the 
trial. Indeed, Mulcahy sees this particular risk in relation to video-conferencing 
technology, writing:
More signifi cant in the present context is the importance of physical presence itself. 
It could be argued that the expectation that a person makes his or her accusation 
in the presence of the accused in a setting designed for public functions speaks to 
119. Th e Civil Procedure Rules, supra note 117 at para 13. 
120. Ibid at paras 13, 19.
121. Chief Judge, District Court of Western Australia, Practice Direction GEN 1 of 2011 – 
Video Link Evidence at 5.1(d), online: District Court of Western Australia <http://www.
districtcourt.wa.gov.au/_fi les/Practice%20Directio n%20GEN%201%20of%202011%20
Use%20of%20Video%20Link%20Facilities.pdf>.
122. Application Under s 83.28 of the Criminal Code, Re, 2004 SCC 42, 2 SCR 248.
123. See generally, Resnik & Curtis, supra note 81.
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a society that has an active public sphere and a sense of the collective. By way of 
contrast, when evidence is transmitted from the home, workplace or hotel room it 
suggest that the performance of civil duty in public has become an inconvenience.124 
In other words, if we understand the “public processes of courts to contribute to 
the functioning of democracies and give meaning to democratic aspirations”125 as 
well as to underwrite the legitimacy of the legal system,126 we should be concerned 
about trials potentially losing vitality and weight if and when court participants 
no longer physically attend in court.
On the other hand, there are also a number of reasons why we might fi nd the 
disruption of traditional trial practices and conventional conceptions of the trial to 
be a positive development. Design is far from benign when it comes to adjudicatory 
spaces.127 As Henri Lefebvre observed, “[s]pace is not a scientifi c object removed 
from ideology or politics; it has always been political or strategic.”128 In the case 
of legal proceedings, notwithstanding the fact that courthouses and courtrooms 
are often designed to “express solemnity, integrity, rigor, and fairness,”129 the 
architecture of these spaces also often operates to reinforce unequal power 
relations and marginalize vulnerable individuals and groups. Mulcahy provides a 
crucial reminder on this issue in her work:
[T]he way space has been used in the courthouse has been fundamental to the 
exercise of power by the privileged, ensuring a certain allocation of people in 
space and a coding of their reciprocal relations. Studies of the architecture of 
courts have, for instance, drawn attention to the ways in which the laity have 
been marginalized in courtroom design and segregated from professionals for fear 
of ‘contamination’. Others have drawn attention to the diffi  culties witnesses have in 
appearing confi dent while describing intimate experiences to other across a large 
intimidating courtroom … Seen in this way, the space in a courtroom becomes a 
particular articulation of social, cultural, and legal relations in which some actors 
are privileged and others disempowered.130 
124. Mulcahy, “Unbearable Lightness,” supra note 106 at 484.
125. Resnik & Curtis, supra note 81 at 301.
126. Markovits, supra note 88 at 184-93.
127. See e.g. the discussion in Mulcahy “Unbearable Lightness,” supra note 106.
128. Henri Lefebvre “Refl ections on the Politics of Space,” translated by Michael J Enders (1976) 
8:2 Antipode 30 at 31. Th e work of Michel Foucault has, of course, also been tremendously 
infl uential on the topic of the ideology of space. See e.g. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: 
the Birth of the Prison, translated by Alan Sheridan (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977).
129. US Courts Design Guide, supra note 109 at 3-1. 
130. Mulcahy, “Unbearable Lightness,” supra note 106 at 480-81. On the issue of segregation, 
David Tait has further observed, “[i]t can be argued that recent courthouses, with up to six 
separate circulation systems, are some of the most segregated buildings in the modern world. 
Judges, court staff , prisoners, protected witnesses, the public—and jurors—may have their 
(2012) 50 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL460
Situated in these critiques, video conferencing cannot simply be seen as a 
way in which witness testimony can be more easily and cheaply presented in 
court. Rather, in removing witnesses from the courtroom, this technology has the 
potential to disrupt the power relations that would otherwise be embedded in an 
adjudicatory process where witnesses physically come to court. 
For Aboriginal communities, in particular, the impact of altering the geography 
of adjudication is complex. Speaking to the Australian context, Anne Wallace queries:
For Aboriginal people who may be more likely to feel intimidated or marginalized 
in the physical courtroom, will the “virtual court” experience add or detract from 
those feelings? Will the additional layer of “technology-mediated communication” 
only add to the linguistic and cultural diff erences that can impede their eff ective 
participation in the courtroom? 
On the other hand, is it possible that for those Aboriginal witnesses, the distancing 
eff ect, and perhaps a less formal approach, may assist their eff ective participation?131
Wallace further reports that discussions with Australian Aboriginal persons 
as part of case studies into the use of video-conferencing technology revealed 
“a clear preference for people to be able to remain within their community to 
deal with legal matters, wherever possible” and that “[t]his is a product not 
just of the diffi  culties and cost associated with arranging travel from remote 
locations, but of the desire of Aboriginal people to remain on their own 
country.”132 If Canadian Aboriginal communities share these preferences, this 
provides a compelling reason to use video-conferencing technology in relation to 
these communities. Exactly how these technologies might be best used in these 
communities, however, would still remain an important question to be determined. 
As Wallace points out, issues such as the location of facilities (e.g., will remote 
witness rooms be located in police stations or community centres?) and levels of 
on-site support are crucial, but are at risk of being given little thought.133 
Outside the context of these particular communities, the risk that video-
conferencing technology will disrupt the geography of adjudication leaves 
lingering, but fundamental questions regarding what type of civil justice system 
we wish to have and what values it will prioritize. As Winner observes:
own distinct network of entrances, staircases, elevators, bathrooms and waiting areas.” See 
David Tait, “Democratic Spaces in a Citadel of Authority” (2009) 98:5 Architecture Australia 
45 at 45.
131. Wallace, supra note 89 at 16.
132. Ibid at 21.
133. Ibid.
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As we “make things work,” [the important question about technology becomes] 
what kind of world are we making? Th is suggests that we pay attention not only to 
the making of physical instruments and processes, although that certainly remains 
important, but also to the production of psychological, social, and political conditions 
as part of any signifi cant technical change.134
By taking witnesses outside the courtroom, video-conferencing technology 
disrupts the geography of adjudication and threatens the solemnity associated 
with, and respect given to, the civil justice system as it is conventionally understood 
today. It also, however, carries with it a liberating potential to shape new court 
process that are more responsive to and inclusive of the public. We need to confront 
the potential transformative power of video-conferencing technology, with 
respect to both the justice system and to society more broadly, rather than simply 
continuing to treat it as a neutral tool at our disposal. 
V. THE CASE FOR CAUTION REVISITED
Parts III and IV, above, explore potential consequences generated by, fi rst, the 
use of video conferencing as a mediating technology and, second, changes to 
the geography of adjudication brought on by video conferencing. Th ey establish 
that, notwithstanding the advanced technology available today, signifi cant risks 
remain in relation to using this technology, including problems with credibility 
assessments, with the emotional connections (or lack thereof ) fostered between 
courtroom participants, and with the solemnity of our adjudicatory processes. 
Moreover, when considered through these perspectives, possible broader political 
and social implications as well as the transformative potential of this technology 
are brought to the forefront.
Th e upshot, in my view, is two-fold. First, our conversations regarding the 
use of video-conferencing technology need to be broadened and deepened beyond 
the now-dominant focus on cost and effi  ciency to include discussions of the 
considerations identifi ed above. Until this happens, we ought to resist barrelling 
ahead with more widespread use of video-conferencing technology in civil justice 
systems. Second, once we more fully confront the possible impacts of video-
conferencing technology, we must consider how we want to further incorporate 
it into our civil justice systems, if at all. At the heart of this decision, it would 
seem to me, are choices about our attitude towards risk, as well as fundamental 
questions about our justice system and how it ought to adapt to meet our needs 
and refl ect our values.  
134. Winner, “Technologies as Forms of Life,” supra note 43 at 112.
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 To be sure, the questions raised are not easy and do not permit straightforward 
answers. Further complicating the picture is the reality that the environment in 
which these issues and values are to be considered is in the midst of signifi cant 
change. Th ere is currently an aggressive move away from the full public trial 
(complete with viva voce in person evidence) as the paradigmatic means of resolving 
civil disputes, towards more tailored, fl exible, and private means of resolving 
disputes.135 Th e shifting ground of the civil justice system also needs to be integrated 
into our evaluation of this technology.
 Moreover, many of the terms used above—such as dignity, democracy, and 
access to justice—are contestable and, indeed, contested. A discussion about 
what these terms mean and how they are to be realized in our justice system 
needs to be brought to the forefront of the conversation about video-conferencing 
technology and the use of other courtroom technologies. Finally, given what is at 
stake, this conversation needs to extend beyond the judiciary and policy makers 
and to be situated within broader public discussion regarding the state of the civil 
justice system. In the words of Andrew Feenburg, “Th e design of technology is … 
an ontological decision fraught with political consequences. Th e exclusion of the 
vast majority from participation in this decision is profoundly undemocratic.”136 
In short, a deeper and broader conversation is required.
VI. CONCLUSION
Technology presents itself as a one-way street; we are likely to dismiss discontents about 
its direction because we read them as growing out of nostalgia or a Luddite impulse or as 
simply in vain. But when we ask what we “miss,” we may discover what we care about, 
what we believe to be worth protecting. We prepare ourselves not necessarily to reject 
technology but to shape it in ways that honor what we hold dear.137
- Sherry Turkle
Th e aim of this article is to reframe the conversation about the use of video 
conferencing in civil trials in Ontario. As the analysis illuminates, there is good 
reason to adopt the cautious approach to this issue that is evident in the current 
judicial consideration of video-conferenced evidence. Th e adoption of video 
conferencing raises both empirical and normative questions that require careful 
135. See Julie MacFarlane, Th e New Lawyer: How Settlement is Transforming the Practice of 
Law (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008); See also Herbert M Kritzer, “Disappearing Trials? A 
Comparative Perspective” (2004) 1:3 J Empirical L Stud 735.
136. Feenberg, supra note 39 at 3.
137. Turkle, supra note 2 at 19.
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attention. I off er no fi nal verdict on the use of this technology in our civil justice 
system. Rather, I take the position that the failure to meaningfully engage with 
its risks means that we are in danger of what Langdon Winner has termed 
“technological somnambulism.”138 In taking witnesses outside the courtroom we 
do much more than simply allow witnesses to avoid the cost and inconvenience 
of having to travel to attend court. We need to wake up and engage with the 
potential unintended and diff use consequences of introducing this technology 
into our courts. Th e operative issue, in my view, is not whether the new tools 
available to us are good or bad but rather how we should use them, if at all, 
in light of our values. Although the path forward remains to be determined, 
it seems clear that we can no longer aff ord to be sleepwalking through these 
important decisions.
138. Winner, “Technology as Forms of Life,” supra note 43 at 104.
